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This paper reexamines the widely-heldwisdom that the currency exposureof in-
ternational investments should be entirely hedged.It finds that the previously-
documented ability of hedges to reduce portfolioreturn variance holds at short
horizons, but not at long horizons. Athorizons of several years, complete hedging
not only does not lower return variance,it actually increases the return variance
of many portfolios. Hedge ratios chosen to
minimize long-run return variance are
not only low, they also have no perceptibleimpact on return variance.The paper
reports and explores these results,their apparent causes, and investigatestheir
implications for hedging practice.
• 1 thank Bob Merton, André Perold, and Jeremy Stein for helpful discussions, and am gratefulto the Department
of Research at liar-yard Business School for generous researchsupport.Currency Hedging Over Long Horizons
1. Introduction
There is considerable disagreement about how international investors should
think about currency risk. Should investors hold the currency components of their
foreign investments, or should they hedge them out? What is the right currency
hedge ratio in the absence of any special information? These questions are being
posed repeatedly today, just as the international diversification question was posed
a decade or two ago.
On the face of it, there is a simple and compelling argument in favor of hedg-
ing which has recently gained wide acceptance among practitioners. It says that
investors should hedge fully because currency hedges do not lower expected returns,
yet substantially reduce the risks of internationalinvestment.1 Empirical evidence
(using high-frequency data) indeed suggests that exchange—rate changes in excess of
the forward discount average about zero, and have virtually no correlation with al-
most any variable, including local-currency returns. It therefore appears as though
the currency aspect of international investment is pure roulette —lotsof indepen-
dent risk which provides no additional average reward. International asset managers
should therefore think of currency hedging as a foregone policy conclusion, or, in
the words of Perold and Schulman (1988), as a "free lunch."2
This paper reexamines the logic and evidence behind this popular argument.
I argue that the "free—lunch" case for hedging is a short-horizon argument, and
that it generally applies only if real exchange rates follow random walks. If, on the
other hand, real exchange rates and asset prices display mean reversion, investors'
optimal portfolio policies will generally depend on investor horizon. Investors with
relatively long horizons may prefer to hedge a good deal less than the free-lunch
1Throughout the paper, the return on a currency hedge denotes the nominal return from holding short-term
domestic bills less the domestic-currency cost of short-term, foreign-currency-denominated borrowing.
3While there are a number of papers that make this argument, the most influential have been those of Perold and
Schulman (1988) and Black (1989). Their studies (as well as those by Madura and Wallace (1985), .Jorion (1989),
Adler, Granito and Lee (1990), Bunk and Enni. (1990),Kaplanisand Schaefer (1991), Nesbitt (1991), and Glen and
.Jonion (199)) demonstrate that currency hedging can improve the risk-return tradeoff of a broad range of foreign
portfolios using monthly and, in some cases, quarterly returns.
1argument would imply.3
I argue below that currency hedgeshave very different properties at longhori-
zons compared withshort horizons. The data showthat while over short horizons
hedging reduces risk substantially,over long horizons, hedgingoften does not reduce
risk at all. hi fact, at long horizons, manyfully-hedged international investments
actually have greater return variancethan their unhedged counterparts.
The properties of currency hedges varywith horizon in part because hedge
returns at different horizons aredriven by very different factors.At relatively short
horizons, hedge returns aredominated by changes in real exchange rates,i.e., in the
purchasing power of one currencycompared with another. However, meanreversion
in real exchange rates implies thatthese purchasing powers tendtoward parity, so
that real exchange rates over timeremain roughly constant.4 At longhorizons,
hedge returns are insteaddàminated by fluctuations in cross-countrydifferences in
unexpected inflation and real interestdifferentials. The importance of thislatter
component grows the longer the hedgeremains in place.5
This decomposition of hedge returnsinto real exchange rate changesand infla-
tion/real_interest-rate surprises isuseful because most asset classeshave very dif-
ferent exposures to the components.Unfortunately, common hedging instruments
bundle the two components together, makingit impossible to hedge each exposure
separately. The result is that hedgeratios must strike a balance —forinvestors pri-
marily concerned with long-horizonmoments, hedge ratios should primarilyreflect
exposure to relativeinflation and interest rate surprises,while for those concerned
3if investor, can tradecostlessly andcontinuously then horizons will not matter eitherif investor preferences
are logarithmic,or ifreturns followrandom walksand investor preferences are iso.elastic. (Samuelson(i9) and
Merton (1969) show that investorhorizonha. no impact on assetallocationwhenreturnsfollowarandom walk,
and Sasnuelson (1991). among others, shows that logarithmicinvestors are myopic. i.e.,that thesolution to their
multiperiod investment problem is the same as though theyhadonly one period to live.) Section 6 below showshow
investor horir.ons generally matter in the presence ofmean.reverlion in asset prices. See also Froot (1993),which
provides an equilibrium model of exchange.rate hedgingthat explicitly incorporates mean reversionand investor
horizon.
'See footnote 17 below for citations to the empirical literature onpurchasing power parity.
5Mean reversion in real exchange rates generally impliesthat expected real returns (in domestic.cumml)on
international investments change over time. Investors maytherdore wish to revise their portfolio allocations as
expected returns evolve. Note, however, that mean
reversion in real exchange rates does not implythat expected
returns on currency hedges are time-varying.
2with short-horizon moments, hedge ratios should primarilyreflect real-exchange-
rate exposure. In this sense, appropriate hedging policies canbe quite sensitive to
investment horizon.
To see this logic at work, consider the following example.Suppose that a US
university endowment buys UK real estate. Supposealso that real-estate prices
are linked to the local CPI, at least overthe longer run.6 Furthermore, in order
to avoid a "speculative" motive for hedging, assumethat the expected return on
hedge positions is zero. Should the endowmenthedge the currency component of
the real estate?
If there is a sudden fall in excess demand for the pound,both a nominal and
real depreciation will result in the short run. Tothe extent that local real estate
values are linked to the CPI, the real value ofthe UK real estate will also fall.
In other words, real estate is highly exposed toreal exchange rate changes. And,
because real exchange-rate changes dominate hedgereturns over short horizons,
hedging can reduce the return variationof the real estate. Thus, the endowment
should hedge if it wants to lower short-horizon returnvolatility.
This policy does not work, however, at longhorizons. Over time, purchasing
power parity (PPP) holds. Subsequentto the shock, the real value of the pound
must rise, through some combination of higher-than-expectedUK inflation or lower-
than-expected UK interest rates. Either way,the dollar value of the real estate will
eventually be restored. In other words, at longhorizons real estate is "naturally
hedged" (for a given value of the real exchangerate) against inflation and interest
rate surprises. Hedging thus does little toreduce long-horizon return volatility.
In fact, complete hedging may. actually add to long-horizonvolatility. To see
this, imagine that the endowment had hedgedits investment in the financial mar-
kets. Years later, the value of the real estatewould be the same as above, but the
financial hedge would have yielded an additional profitfrom the pound's unexpected
depreciation. If the opposite had occurred —thatis, if the pound had appreciated
6The assumption that real estate is linked to the CPI appears reasonable, both empiricallyand dennitionailY (CPIs
are constructed using real estate price). However, as will becomeclear below, if this assumption is relaxed there ta
little reason to hedge evenovershort horisona.
3due to a similar disturbance in the US —thehedge position would show a loss.
Thus, while the real estate is naturally hedged against inflation and interest rate
surprises, these surprises dominate hedge returns at long horizons. In this way, the
financial hedge can actually raise the volatility of real estate returns.
An identical set of arguments holds for UK stocks, which —asthe results
below suggest —appearto have exposures to real-exchange rate changes and past
inflation/interest-rate surprises that are similar to those of real estate.That is, the
real domestic value of foreign stocks is not very sensitive to such surprises, given
the real exchange rate.7 On the other hand, the dollar value of UK stocks is highly
sensitive to the real exchange rate. This exposure pattern implies that hedging can
help reduce return variation at short horizons (where real-exchangerate changes
dominate hedge returns), but not at long horizons (where relative inflation shocks
dominate). Thus, a strategy of hedging international equity investmentsdoes not
by itself reduce long-horizon return variance.
The critical implication of these examples is that a wide variety of international
investments should probably not be hedged as aggressively when investorshave
long horizons.8 The data presented below support this idea,and suggest that
while complete hedging is the best strategy for investors who care primarily about
short-horizon moments, no hedging at all is likely to be best for those who care
primarily about long-horizon moments. The case for "going naked" becomes even
stronger if one considers the transactions costs and counterpartyrisks that hedging
inevitably adds. In practice, it may be that over long horizons, unhedged portfolios
yield both lower long-horizon risk and higher average return than their fully-hedged
counterparts.
In addition to shedding light on hedging policy, our analysis has implications
for the appropriate benchmark against which the performance of foreign portfolios
should be measured. For example, pension investors with a long investment horizon
TBoudoukh and Richardson (1993) show that while domestic stocks are approximately uncorrelated with domestic
inflation over short horizons, theyarehighly positively correlated with domestic inflation over long horizons.
'A similar argumenthold, for Snominal•assets, such as foreigTl-cUrrenCY-deflomiflated bonds sad bills. For details,
seethe discimsion below.
4may wish to use an unhedged portfoliobenchmark for evaluating their portfolio
manager's performance. Investors with medium orshort horizons, may prefer a
partially or fully hedged benchmark. More generally,the formulation of hedge ratios
should explicitly account for specific asset exposuresand investment horizons.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discussesmeasurement and data
issues. Section 3 then examines the effect of currencyhedges on return volatility
of different asset classes at different horizons. Section4 decomposes hedge returns
into their two components —realinterest differentials and changes in real exchange
rates —andexamines the properties of each. It also reportsestimates of the asset
exposures to the individual hedge components.In order to help understand what
the long-horizon results imply for hedging practice,section 5 provides a theoretical
examination of how optimal hedging demands aredetermined by investor horizon,
preferences, and mean reversion in real exchangerates. Section 6 discusses several
other implications of the results. Finally, section 7concludes.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Notation and Methodology
Consider a domestic investor with an investment, X,denominated in a foreign
currency. Her k-period (log) real return canbe written as:
(1)
where 4isthe continuously-compounded return in local currency onthe investment
between time t and t + Ast is the change inthe log of the domestic-currencY
price of foreign exchange over the same time period;and r is the change in the
log of the domestic CPI.
An exchange-rate hedge involves short-term borrowingin one currency and
lending in the other. Denote the k-period domestic-currencylog return on such a
hedge. by:
k—i
=i4, )4 =+Ift — (2)
5where 1j,tisthe continuousiycompounded local-currency return onthe foreign one-
period riskless asset, and 1dtisthe analogous return on the domestic riskless asset.
Naturally, these hedge returns can be synthesizedin the futures market or in the
forward market by rolling over one—periodcontracts.9
Combining equations (1) and (2) yields the k-periodreturn on a hedged invest-.
ment:
(3)
whereis the hedge ratio. If>0,the domestic investor is short the foreign
currency, i.e., has borrowed in foreign currencyand lent out the proceeds in domestic
currency; if c0then the investor is short domestic currency. Avalue of 4= 1
corresponds to a complete beginning-of-period hedgeof the foreign investment; i.e.,
borrowings of foreign exchange equal to the initialvalue of the investment X.
Hedging has an effect on average returns to theextent that the unconditional
mean of h is different from zero. Thereis a large literature examining the a-
pectation of h, often referred to as the exchangerisk premium- (For surveys see,
for example, Froot and Thaler (1989) and Levich (1985).)The basic facts about
this risk premium can be fairly summarized in two statements.First, empirical
estimates of average risk premia are not significantly differentfrom zero, either eco-
nomically or statistical1y.0 (This is also true of the particulardata sets used in this
paper —seethe results below.) There is thus no average foreign exchangepremia
that is comparable to the average premia on equities orbonds.11- Second, these
empirical results are in agreement with mosttheoretical models of the exchange
risk premium, which suggest that premia ought to besmall.12
°lt is also possible to hedge a k-period investment with k-period borrowingandlendingcontract. (or with k-period
forward contracts). However, in this paper we assume that the hedge employs only one-penodinstruments.
10For studies which discws this result see, for example, Froot and Frankel (1989) and Rogoff (1979).
"At quarterly or monthly frequencies, conditional expectations of h' (based on regression.)have been found to
be statistically different from gero. However, while these conditional expectations are quite largeand variable, they
oscillate betwem negative and positive, averaging about gem. It remains an unresoived question asto whether these
high-frequency movements in conditional expectations are best interpreted a. changes in risk (giveninvestors' portfolio
holdings), or as opportunities for some tradem to earn excess returns on marginal investmentsin foreign exchange.
For a discussion of these issues in light of recent theory and statistical modeling, see Froot andThe.ler (1990).
'2For example, Frankel (1988) demonstrates that in a mean-variance framework, foreigs exchange premiawill
generally be limited to a few basis points for major currencies. Giovaanini and Jorion (1988) reachsimilar conclusions.
6Taken together, these two facts suggest that we do little harm to the data or
our priors if we assume that expected hedge returns equal theirunconditional mean
of zero (i.e., uncovered interest parity (UIP) holds). If UIP does not hold, so that
conditionally expected hedge returns vary over time, use of the total return /4in
(3) remains appropriate for investors who neverthelesswish to select a constant
hedge ratio.13
To estimate the effects of hedging on the variance of real returns at different





A second, and related, approach is to estimate the minimum-variance hedge
through a regression of the k-period unhedged return on the contemporaneous hedge
return:
(5)
wherekisthe minimum-variance hedge ratio.
The second approach allows for a straightforward test of the hypothesis that
unhedged and fully hedged return variances are equal, i.e., thatVk = 1. Under this
hypothesis, var(r) =var(rt
—hp),which implies var(ht') = 2cov(r, h). if (3 in
(5) is given by the OLS estimator, /3 =coy '.!, thehypothesis that Vk = 1 can
var
be written as /3 = 1/2. Thus, a test of whether the minimum-variance hedgeratio
equals 1/2 is also a test of the hypothesis that unhedged and fully hedgedreturn
variances are equal. if (3 >1/2,the variance of hedged returns is smaller than that
of unhedged returns, and if /3 c1/2the reverse is true.
The 11s from the regressions can be interpreted as the amount of risk elimi-
nated by the minimum-variance hedge. In a sense, this measure of hedging efficacy
'31n order to see whether the results are sensitive to the assumption of UIP, I ran the tests below using several
specifications For time-varying expected hedge returns. The results were qualitatively unaffected.
'The estimates of k.period variances below include an adjustment for small sample bias under the hypothesis
that the return processes are random walks with drift. Specifically, variances for all k are taken aroundthe same,
one-period mean. An unbiased estimate of each component of (4) also requires a multiplicative degrees-of-freedom
adjustment of T/T —k+ 1. where T is the number of return observations during the sample period. See,for example,
Cochrane (1988).
7is more important than the point estimate of fi.Ifminimum-variance hedging has
little effect on the variance of unhedged returns, then regardless of the magnitude
of the minimum-variance hedge ratio; the case for hedging is weak.
2.2. Data
To learn about long horizon hedging, it is necessary to employ a long historical
data sample. This paper uses data on US stock prices and US and UK interest
rates from. 1802 to 1990obtainedfrom Schwert (1990) and Siegel (1992). Since the
longest and best-quality time series available are for US stocks and bonds, wefocus
on real returns on US instruments from the perspective of UKresidents.
The stock index for the US is a total return index intended to resemble a broad
group of individualstocks.15 The long-term-bond rate series is from Siegel (1992) ,16
as are the short-term interest rates.17
Exchange-rate data are from Diebold, Husted, and Rush (1991) and the original
citations therein. The sample period spans a number of different exchange-rate
regimes —goldstandard, bimetalic standard, and floating currencies. During the
early part of the sample the US was initially on a variety of metallic standards (1802
-1862);it then left the gold standard and issued inconvertible paper currency, or
greenbacks (1862-1879); the US then reinstated the gold standard and remained on
it until 1913. Over this same period, the UK issued inconvertible paper (1802-1820),
"The index provides rathc limited diversificaLionprior to1870;untilthat lime the index was comprised primarily
of bankand railroad stocks.
The series is a mixture of Treasury bond and high-grade municipalbond yieldsfrom 1802to 1917. Alter 1917, US
governmentbonds are used. Holding period returns are calculated from the yield data using a linearited model of the
term structure. This was done by computing McCaulay's (1936) measure of duration (D).as.umingthat long-term
yields represented, on average, 15-year maturities, with coupons equal to the yield:
—1—(ll-it,e)T —
i—(1+(1+ie,Y"
where i,s represents the time-I yield on bonds, and 1' =15.(None of the results appear sensitive to the assumption
that T =15years.) Next, the one-period holding return on bonds was calculated as:
= — (D — i) (it+t.n + !2(i.+ —
wherei,,.isthe time-I yield on one-period bills. Shiller, Campbell, and Schoenholts (1983) show that this simple
linearised model gives close approximations to various nonlinear models.
Prior to 1920, there was no short-term govermnent or Treasury bill rate. Siegel therefore attempts to remove the
risk premium from ,hort4erm US commercial paper rates during this period by using information from bond rates
and the UK term premium.
8then remained on the gold standardfor the rest of the period (1820-1913).Between
1913 and 1973, both the US andUK retained fixed exchange rates, except during
brief periods when the exchange rate wasallowed to float. During most of the 1973
-1990period, both currenciesfloated freely.
The main advantage of such a longsample period is that differences in the
behavior of nominal and real exchangerates are easily detected. Studies which
use shorter samples typicallyconclude that the real exchange rate iswell-described
by the same stochastic processthat describes the nominal exchangerate —aran-
dom walk)-8 This description of thereal exchange rate may be approximately cor-
rect over short horizons. But over longhorizons it is has a somewhatimplaU5ible
implication —i.e.,that arbitrarily large deviationsfrom purchasing power parity
(PPP) among countries withsimilar income levels can bemaintained indefinitely.
A number of studies are able to rejectthis hypothesis, but they need to uselonger
time-series samples to gain power againstthe random-walkalternative.'0
Of course, the use of this long time-seriessample has disadvantages aswell as
advantages. One potential disadvantageis that prevailing monetary arrangements
changed several times. During periodsof fixed exchange rates, bothnominal and
real exchange rates tended to displayconsiderably less short-horizon variabilitythan
they did during floating-rateperiods?°
However, the long-horizon propertiesof the real exchange rate shouldbe least
affected by the nature of monetary arrangements
—which,most economists believe,
should have no long-run effects. Thus,the main bias created by the presenceof
fixed-rate periods in our sample is that hedgingwill appear relatively less important
at short horizons than would bethe case for a sample which consistedexclusively of
floating rates. Note that this biasactually works toward strengthening ourfindings.
That is, our results —whichsuggest that hedging is disproportionatelyless useful
1Studi which examine the random-walk behavior of real
and nominal exchange rate include Roil (1979).Meese
and Rogoff (1988),Muss. (1986), and Baille and McMahon (1989).
t9See,for example,Frankel(1986),Huitinga(1987),andDiebold,Husted, andRush (1991)andthecitations
therein. Their data put the half-life of real exchanrrate
movements at between S and 5 years.
20For more documentation of the effect of exchange-rate regime on
short-horizon exdjang&rate behavior, seeMuss.
(1986).
9at long horizons than at short horizons —wouldprobably apply even more strongly
if the present system of floating rates had beenexistence for almost 200years.
2.3. Summary statistics
Tables 1 and 2 present summary statisticsfor the entire data set and two
sub-samples.21 The tables help make several points. First,the pound/dollar real
exchange rate has fluctuated considerably,but has not changed much on average
over the last 180years.22
Second, note that the real exchange rateis quite variable. Its standard devia-
tion is about 9 percent per annum overthe full sample, rising to 16 percent during
the 1973-1991 floating-rate period. In addition,the real exchange rate exhibits
strong (and statistically significant)negative autocorrelation at longerhorizons,
even though it is approximatelyuncorrelated at one-year horizons. (This pattern
is suggestive of how hard it is to rejectthe random-walk hypothesis using high-
frequency data.)
Third, the pound return on US stocks inTable 1 seems to inherit some of
the real exchange rate's negative autocorrelation,particularly at longer horizons.
(The negative autocorrelation. ofreal dollar stock returns in Table 2 ismuch less
pronounced at long horizons.) Table 1 alsoshows that this is not the case forbonds
and bills.
3. Hedged versus Unhedged Portfolios
Table 3 compares the variance of unhedgedand hedged real returns. Reported
in the top panel is the variance ratio,Vk, for several US investments (from the
perspective of UK residents) at shortand long investment horizons. The middle
and bottom panels display, respectively, the numeratorand denominator of Vi',
i.e., the variances of both unhedged andhedged returns (units are in percent per
2tthereare many natural' break pointsarein this data sample. The commencement of the recentfloating rate
period (1973) is useful to detect how different floating rates havebeen relative to the average experience. Becauseof
the a number of problems with the stock index and the US price data prior
to about 1880, we also break the sample
there. Al! of the tests below were run using these same breakpoints,with little evidence of parameter instability.
22Consumption in the US ha. become more expensive relative to thatin the UK (Table 1, line 1) at the rate of only
12 basis point. per annum. Moreover, almcet all of this relative increasein US prices ocèurred in the 19th century,
whentheUS was catching up to the UK in terms of economic development.
10annum). The investments are: US "rear assets whose nominal returns are given by
changes in the US CPI (these assets might be thought of as adiversified portfolio
of durables, including real estate); US stocks; US bonds; and USbills. The nominal
returns on these asset classes are then converted into poundsand deflated by the
change in the UK CPI.
Table 3 shows that the relative variance of unhedged returns declines as hold-
ing horizon increases. At one-year horizons, unhedgedstock portfolios exhibit 13
percent more real-return variance than their hedged counterparts.However, when
the horizon is increased to just three yearn, the variance of unhedged returnsfalls to
a level marginally below that of hedged returns. Foreignbonds and bills also show
a substantial decline in the relative varianceof unhedged returns as the horizon
increases.
Table 4 presents results from the estimation of equation (5). The top panel
reports minimum-variance (MV) hedge ratios atvarious holding horizons. As ex-
pected from Table 3, the MV hedge ratios for all assetsdecline almost uniformly
as the holding horizon increases. Hedge ratiosfor stocks decline more rapidly in
the first few years than do those for other assets. In addition,the drop in point
estimates is large from a policy perspective: while the short-horizonestimates sug-
gest that variance is minimized through nearly completehedging, the long-horizon
estimates point toward MV hedge ratios of between 13 and 42percent.23
At standard levels of statistical significance, it is possible to rejectthe hypoth-
esis that the one-year MV hedge ratio equals one (which would implythat 13k = 1)
for real assets and bills, even though the point estimates are economicallyclose to
one. As one would expect, however, thestandard errors increase markedly with
the holding horizon. In spite of the long time-series sample, the data providelittle
power against the hypothesis that /3 = 1at very long investment horizons —we
can reject this hypothesis at 7- or S-year horizons only inthe case of real assets.
'3Asmentionedabove, we might expect theshort-horiaon coefficientestimates to be closer to one duringsample
periods which consist exclusively of floating exchange rates. indeed, this seems to be the case; forexample, using data
from the 1973-1991 sample only, the point estimates ofare 0.87 (0.06), 1.20 (0.22), 0.74 (0.21),and0.96 (0.08) for
real assets, stocks, bonds, and bills, respectively (standard errors in parentheses).
11However, at more intermediate horizons of 3 and 4 years, thereis enough power to
reject 0k= 1for real assets, stocks, and bills. (For bonds it is possible to reject
=1at the 10 percent level only at six-year horizons.)
The large standard errors make it even harder to rejectthe hypothesis that
the variance of fully hedged and unhedged portfolios are equal, i.e.,that=1/2.
For all of the asset classes at long horizons, the null hypothesisof =1/2cannot
be rejected in favor of the alternative that<1/2.However, it is possible to
reject this null hypothesis at short horizons, albeit infavor of the alternative that
/3>1/2.
If hedging becomes less effective at longer horizons, we would expect not only
that MV hedge ratios fall, but also that they reduce variance by less.This implies
that the R2s from (5) ought to decline as holding horizon rises. Table 4 reports
these R2s in the middle panel. While hedging reduces return variation substantially
at short horizons, the R2s fall dramatically at longer horizons. At horizonsof 8
years, even the minimum-variance hedgehas virtually no impact on real-return
variation. Minimum-variance hedging remains most useful for real assets, where it
leads to a 7 percent reduction in variance (versus a 42 percent reduction at one-year
horizons). For stocks, bonds and bills, minimum-variance hedging has a reasonably
large impact on short-horizon variance, but has essentially no ability toreduce
long-horizon return variance.
To sum up, this section looked at two measures of currency hedging efficacy —
themagnitude of the MV hedge and the variance reduction the MV hedgeaffords.
By both measures, currency hedging appears less effective at longhorizons than
at short. There is no evidence at relatively long horizons that currency hedging
provides a reduction in return variation.
4. Explaining differences between long- and short-horizon hedges
This section explores the reasons behind the above results. The explanation
posed in the introduction has two parts. It states that: 1) realexchange-rate changes
dominate hedge returns over short horizons while relative inflation and interest-rate
12surprises dominate over long horizons; and ii) asset exposures to real-exchange-rate
changes are larger than exposures to relative inflation surprises (at least for "real"
assets and stocks). In this section we look at both parts of this hypothesis.
4.1. Decomposing hedge returns
By adding and subtracting relative inflation on the right-hand side of (2), the
hedge return can be rewritten as the change in the real exchange rate plus the
cumulative short-term real interest differential:
=
(Akst+ — + —r},t+j)
—(1d,t+y — k+))(7)
A"S +i4,
where=E: I =f,d, is the k-period realized inflation in country 1;
AkSt is the k-period change in the log of the real exchange rate; and lit is the
k-period cx post real interest differential.
If purchasing power parity holds in the long run, then real exchange rate
changes are temporary, i.e., St is mean-reverting. This implies that the per pe-
riod variance of the real exchange rate will decline toward zero as horizon increases:
Var(&Sti lim =0. (8)
jc.
Equation(8) will not generally hold for the other component of hedge returns,
the cx post real interest differential. To see this, note that the interest differential




— ,+5H(kt+r ,t+j))' (9)where is the time-t+j expectation of inflation betweentime t +5andt +5+1.
Redefining the two terms on the right-hand side of (9), wehave:
(10)
whereD is the sum of the cx ante real interestdifferentials between times t and
t + k, and c is the sum of the one-step ahead errorsmade in predicting the actual
inflation differential between times tandt + k.
The second right-hand-side term in equations (9) and (10)is a random walk,
so its average variance does not vanish as k increases:
limVar(c)= , (ii)
k—'ook
where u is the unconditional single-period variance of relativeinflation surprises. In
many models first term on the right-handside of (10), D, also contains permanent
components.24 Either way, the variance of R will have a component —thatof
relative inflation surprises —whichgrows linearly withk.25 The presence of these
relative inflation surprises therefore suggests that the long-horizonvariance of h
will be dominated by variation in R.
Is this characterization of hedge-return components borne out bythe data?
Table 5 examines the variances and cross-correlations of the hedge returnand its
components, &'s and R. Note that the variance of Rdoes indeed grow more
quickly with k than that of tJSt: At ten-year horizons, thevariance of litincreases
to approximately 10 times the variance of R, while the correspondingvariances of
tiS increase only about 5 fold. Furthermore, note that in Table 5, the correlation
between real-exchange-rate changes and hedge returns (n,2) declines with increases
in horizon, falling from 0.65 at 1-year horizons to 0.21 at 10-year horizons. Mean-
while, the correlation between real interest differentials and hedgereturns (pt,s)
increasesfrom 0.27 to 0.41.
24Thesimplestdescription of the cx ante real interest differentialisprobably the international Fisherhypothesis,
whichholdsthat Dt= 0.In more compla monetary models, such as that of Dornbusch (1976), the timeseries of cx
ante real interest differentials is stationery (following a moving average process), so that pk(thek-period cumulative
sum of cx ante real interest differentials) is nonstationary.
25This requires that the cumulative cx ante real inta'est differential is not cointegrated with the cumulative relative
uifiabon surprises with a cointegraling coefficient of negative one.
14Table 5 therefore provides some evidence in support of the first part of the
hypothesis above —thatas horizon increases, the real-exchange-rate component of
hedge returns increases and the inflation/interest-rate-differential component de-
creases.
4.2. Decomposing asset exposures
The second necessary link for explaining the behavior of hedge ratios concerns
the nature of asset exposures. Clearly, if most assets have the same degree of
exposure to both components of the hedge return, then our decomposition is not
very useful for understanding why MV hedge ratios change with horizon. However,
based on the logic above, we would expect most assets to have different exposures
to the hedge components. For example, it would seem natural for both "real" assets
and stocks to be more sensitive to the real exchange rate than to relative inflation
shocks (at a given real exchange rate).
To see this point, let us return to the endowment's purchase of UK real estate.
If the dollar price of the real estate tracks the cost of living in the UK, the real
dollar price will be influenced by the real exchange rate. However, because the real
exchange rate is mean reverting, the long-run value of the real estate is essentially
independent of current shocks to relative inflation and real interest rates. Thus,
we expect to see greater exposure of real assets to the real exchange rate than to
relative inflation or interest rate shocks. To the extent that equities behave like real
assets, this long-horizon behavior ought to hold for stocks as well.
Fixed-income investments, on the other hand, are likely to be exposed to rela-
tive inflation shocks as well as to the real exchange rate. The magnitudes of these
exposures will depend on the relative importance of domestic versus foreign inflation
shocks.
To see this, suppose that the endowment buys a k-period zero-coupon UK bond.
From (1), the k-period return on this foreign bond is=+Es's and
the change in the real exchange rate is LS.!St =+ — Fora given level
of UK inflation (irj,thebond return moves one-for-one with shocks to the real
15exchange rate. This means that if there is a shock to[iS inflation, the real return
on the foreign bond will be affected only to the extentthat the real exchange rate
changes. At long horizons the foreign bond is "naturally hedged" againstdomestic
inflation shocks. Hedging will be helpful at short horizons, however, when changes
in real exchange rates are large.
This situation is reversed if inflation shocks are primarily foreign. In that case,
unexpected UK inflation depreciates the pound and causes a loss to the endowment
even if the real exchange rate remains unchanged. Inother words, the foreign
bond's exposure to relative inflation shocks will be driven by the importanceof
foreign inflation shocks. When foreign inflation shocks dominate, hedging provides
protection at short as well as at long horizons.
In sum, the component exposures of fixed-income investments will be deter-
mined by the source of inflation shocks. Larger foreign inflation shocks will increase
the exposure to relative inflation surprises, and larger domestic inflation shocks will
increase exposure to real exchange-rate changes.
4.2.1. Measuring asset exposures
The.next step is to measute these component exposures empirically. We there-
fore regress the foreign asset's real return on the two components of hedge returns
—realinterest differentials and real exchange rat.e changes:
= + + + c, (12)
where andf3measureasset exposures to real interest differentials and real-
exchange-rate changes, respectively.
Note that the /3coefficientscan be interpreted as hedge ratios if we think
of R and E&kSt as returns on component hedge contracts. In fact, it is possible
to interpret asthe return on a "real" hedge contract, i.e., the return from
borrowing and lending in each currency at "real bill" rates, which areindexed to
actual inflation.26
To makethis interpretationwork, it is necessary to assume that the Fisher hypothesis holds, and that the premium
16Under this interpretation, &S can be thought of as the return on a "real"
hedge, and R =h_&cStis the noise introduced by using nominal instead of "real"
hedging contracts. While nominal and real magnitudes are often tightly linked at
short horizons, their linkages are at best loose at long horizons. Thus, by looking
at asset exposures to A1S and R, we can determine whether our hypothetical
"real" currency hedging contracts would provide better hedging vehicles than their
nominal counterparts.27
4.2.2. Estimation
Table 6 displays estimates of equation (12). We report the j3 coefficient esti-
mates, their standard errors, and the regression 112.Asbefore, we can interpret the
f3s as MV hedge ratios and the R2s as the percentage reduction in return variances
provided by the MV hedges?
The results in Table 6 contrast strikingly with those in Table 4. First, note
that exposures to real exchange rate changes are about full, i.e., = 1.These
estimates are even slightly higher than the hedge ratios reported in Table 4. Fur-
thermore, the exposure levels do not fall for stocks and bills as horizon increases.
(Exposures do fall for bonds, albeit slightly.) The estimates ofare generally
statistically indistinguishable from 1, significantly greater than zero, and in many
cases significantly greater than 1/2. One interpretation is that complete hedging
using real contracts would minimize variance regardless of horizon. Furthermore,
portfolios hedged fully with our hypothetical real hedges exhibit significantly less
return variance than do unhedged portfolios.
on short-t&,n real bills over short-term nominally Skless bills is constant. Using these two assumptions, the return
on the one-period reaP hedge, h,,equalsthe change in the real exchange rate (plus a constant):
=A'S, ÷c.
37j aiso tried to estimate exposuresto 5realhedge returns using specifications for expected inflation of other than
the Fisher effect. For example, it might be reasonable to assume that expected next-period inflation is a linear function
of current inflation,
=
wherea i. the first-order autocorrelation coefficient of actual inflation. This assumption is realistic to the extent that
actual inflation is closely approximated by an AR(1) process. The results reported below are not importantly effected
by using this .lternative specification.
25 this specification, the real return on US real assets I. both the dependent variable and one of the regressors.
i.e., r1 =A&S,. Asa consequence, no results are reported in Table 6 for real assets.
17Second, note that the R2s do not decline with increases in horizonas substan-
tially as they did in Table 4. Indeed, the R2 for stock returns actually riseswithk.
This suggests not only that real exchange rate exposures remain large as horizon
increases, but that hedging them would continue to result in substantial variance
reduction.
Third, note that exposures toare positive at short horizons and become
negative at longer horizons. The point estimates, however, are never statistically
different from zero. The decline occurs most rapidly in stocks —atthree-year hori-
zons the estimate has already become negative —andmuch more slowly for bonds
and bills. As we argued above, we would expect stocks to have relatively little
relative-inflation-differential exposure to the extent that they behave like "real" as-
sets. Bonds and bills, on the other hand, ought to have some real-interest-differential
exposures, at least to the extent that the source of CPI shocks is domestic. The low
estimates offor bonds and bills suggest that, in the sample, most CPI shocks
originate in the UK.
Fourth, note that stocks do indeed behave like other "real" assets. That is,
when the foreign currency depreciates, the price of foreign equities does not rise in
the short run, even though it does rise in the long run. The fact that estimates of
/3 remain constant at about one suggests that the local currency value of stocks
does ultimately rise, and that it does so at the same rate at which the real exchange
rate returns to its long-run mean. In this sense, domestic stock prices behave like
the relative domestic CPI —whenconsumption is relatively cheap in a country, its
stocks are relatively cheap too.
Similar conclusions emerge from Table 7. It reports the results from a regression
of asset returns on the real exchange rate (or return on a "real" hedge contract)
alone:
k k kk k = & +P2l s + e. 13
Once again, the estimates of I3,remainnear one as k increases. This might be also
be interpreted as showing that MV "real" hedge ratios are not affected by horizon.
18"Real" hedges also appear to substantially reduce return variance, even at long
horizons.29
5. Incorporating "long horizons" into investor asset demands
While it would seem intuitively important for investors to consider both long-
and short-horizon moments of the data, standard finance theory provides relatively
little guidance about impact of long-horizon moments on optimal asset allocation.
This is partly because the results are sensitive to both the statistical properties of
returns and investor preferences, and partly because the results are often compli-
cated. The goal of this section is to provide a very simple example in which it is
possible to see clearly the effects of mean reversion, investor horizon, and investor
preferences on optimal hedging policy.
Consider, then, a 2-period niodel with a domestic investor who is concerned
with the distribution of wealth at the end of date 2. Suppose that this investor can
choose between foreign stocks and a domestic riskless asset, and that he allocates a
fraction of wealth —wj atdate U and ca2 at date 1 —toforeign stocks. Assume also
that these fractional allocations are continuously maintained between dates 0 and
1, and dates 1 and 2, respectively. During these periods, the local currency price
of the foreign stock, p(t), yields a geometric excess return (above the local riskless
rate) of:
dp(t) = +a,1p(t)dz, I =1,2V tE L — 1,11. (14)
We assume that the investor can hedge a fraction, 4,,ofthe foreign exchange
exposure of the stocks by borrowing in foreign currency and lending in domestic
currency. The excess return on the hedge evolves according to:
dh(t) =Ch,Ih(t)dzh,I =1,2V tE [I — 1,1], (15)
where we assume that the instantaneous correlation between the local-currency re-
turn on foreign stocks and the hedge return is given by p. Equation (15) implies
°5inillarresults emerge when using estimates of reaF hedge returns other than tskSt. This suggests that the
results axe notverysensitive to the particular assumptions needed tointerprettks, as the return on a 5rear hedge.
19that hedge positions have zero expected returns fromdomestic investors' perspec-
tive. At time 0, the investor also chooses a hedge ratio, ,whichis continuously
maintained until time 1. Also, assume for simplicity that the domesticinterest rate
is zero and that domestic consumption prices are fixed.The price of foreign con-
sumption is fixed through date 1, so that we can interpretas the change in the
real exchange rate through date 1.
In this setting, mean reversion in real asset prices can easilybe added by making
the expected future local-currency return on stocks, Pj,,2,adeclining function of the
past real-exchange-rate change Thatis, subsequent to a current appreciation
(depreciation) of the real exchange rate, the expected future local-currencyreturn
on stocks will be low (high). Specifically, we assumethat = —
wherea =_c.1P2; i.e.,a =0implies that there is no correlation between current
exchange-rate changes and future local-currency stock returns,and a =1implies
that the entire increase in the current real exchange rate between dates 0and 1 is on
average offset through slower domestic-currency stock-priceappreciation between
dates 1 and 2.
Under these assumptions, the instantaneous return on the investor'swealth
expressed in domestic currency, R(t), can be written as:
=w(ii,,1 + pch,Ic1)dt + o (aj + (1—h)2c+ 2(1
—
h)pah,cP,1)2dz,(16)
which in turn yields an expression for the compounded full-period return onwealth






and a similar expression for the return on wealth from date 1 to 2,






20where we have assumed (without loss of generality) that there is no exchange_rate
uncertainty between times 1 and 2, i.e., ch2 =0.
Next, let investor preferences be iso-elastic over tinie-2 wealth,
E[U2] =E[(R1R2)1/j/?e', (19)
with 'y =0representing the case of logarithmic utility. The first-order condition
with respect to the hedge ratio, ,is:
E[!] =E[(RiR2y::] =0. (20)
Straightforward computations and equations (14)-(19) allow us to solve (20) for the
optimal hedge ratio, ',whichis given by:
ch 1 cov[ln2M},lnR2] i=1+ '.—-( 2 *)' (21)
ch ChW1
where crh,1 =PChUp,1is the instantaneous covariance between local-currency stock
returns and hedge returns between dates 0 and 1.
Equation (21) shows how horizon and preferences enter into the determination
of the optimal hedge ratio. A single-period investor will not care about R2, and
thus will regard the second term on the right-hand side of (21) as irrelevant. That
is, a short-horizon investor will choose
(22)
Note that (22) is independent of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, .Addthis
to the fact that over short horizons h,p10, and represents the "free-lunch"
result —i.e.,that regardless of preferences, the optimal hedge ratio is near one.
As is well known, either of two conditions are sufficient to make the short-
horizon hedge ratio, optimalfor investors who have longer horizons. First, if
investors have logarithmic utility (i =0),then they behave "myopically" regardless
of their horizons. Second, if the investment opportunity set is constant (so that
21a = 0), then the covariance term in (21) is zero,and the short-horizon hedge ratio
is optimal, even for non-log preferences.
In order to see how much long-horizon moments matter for non-log preferences,
it is possible to rewrite (21) as:
4=i+1 +l()(a+a' '1), (23)
Wj
where w is the fraction of wealth in stocks between dates 0 and 1,30 &isthe
median optimal fraction of wealth in stocks between dates 1 and2,31 a 0hji2
a parameter indicating the degree of mean reversionin real stock prices, and a1 is
a measure of how aggressively w is expected to respondto the mean reversion in
the real exchange rate (a' = a indicates an optimal response to changingexpected
stock returns, whereas c/=0 indicates no response at all). That is, a1 measures
how aggressively portfolio managers trade foreign equities on thebasis of current
deviations from PPP.
There are several points to note from (23). First, the hedge ratiodeclines
as mean reversion is stronger (i.e., as a is greater)and as preferences are more
risk averse (i.e., as '1 is more negative).32 Second, note that the investor hedges
less when future holdings of foreign equities respond more aggressivelyto mean
reversion in the real exchange rate (i.e., fP,< 0).Third, note that even if a = 0,
mean reversion still tends to reduce the hedge ratio.
Finally, note that by increasing the amount of "time" betweendates 1 and 2,
we can increase the effective "horizon" of the investor.When we do so, a (and




(°,L+ (1— #)2a31-2(1 — )pce,jap,i)(1 —
i.e.,theinstantaneousexpected domestic.currency return on foreign stocks divided by the varianceof domestic-
currency returns on foreign stockslimes the coefficientof relative risk aversion, 1—. Note thatequation (23) applies
regardless of whether w is set optimally.
5tThis is computed by taking the median of the date-2 optimal fraction of wealth in stocks:
—M(ss,.,]=
20,,2(1 —i)a,3(1 —i)' -
where Alimplies the median operator, which is taken at date 0 with respect to the exchange-rate changebetween
dates0 and1,141)/Iz(0).Notethat, for plausible parameters, 0/w > 1.
"Thisresult is evenstronger thanit mightappear, aswhen #decreases,so does the ratio
22possibly a1)increase,as more of the return to PPP occurs on average by date 2.
Thus, further increases in time horizon further lower the hedge ratio (given that
preferences are more risk averse than log, i.e., that y <0).
It may be useful to calibrate this model. This will give us a sense for how
sensitive optimal hedge ratios are to changes in preferences, horizon, and mean
reversion. Suppose for a moment that 'y =—1(this is the "Samuelson presumption"
that the coefficient of relative risk aversion equals 2). Also, think of date-i as a
"short" horizon (perhaps a year) and date-2 as a "long" horizon equal to the average
half-life of a deviation from parity (about 3 to 5 years). This would imply f10
cTII
anda0.5. Finally, assume that a1= a,so that portfolio managers respond
optimally to any change in expected domestic-currency returns on foreign stocks.
These assumptions imply that the optimal hedge ratio is considerably less than
0.25! Clearly, the optimal hedge ratio will be very sensitive to assumptions about
risk aversion and length of horizon.
The optimal hedge ratio will also be sensitive to equilibrium returns on hedge
contracts. In a one-period equilibrium model, Black (1989) shows that log-utility
investors do not hedge at all (as compared with (23), which for plausible parame-
ters, says they hedge completely). In Black's model, there is a greater temptationto
bear foreign-exchange risk than in the model above because such foreign exchange
exposure generates positive expected returns due to Siegal's paradox.Thus, in-
vestors in that model hedge fully only when they are considerably more risk averse
than the log case. Froot (i993) provides an equilibrium model which allows for
long-horizon mean-reversion of real exchange rates. In that model, optimal hedge
ratios (for investors more risk averse than log) are lower than those implied by the
Black model. This is because, in the presence of mean reversion, investors must
bear considerably more risk if they wish to take advantage of the positive expected
returns generated by Siegal's paradox.
236. Some additional implications
6.1. The timing of foreign investments
The results above suggest that, in the short run, foreign stocks become cheaper
in domestic terms when the foreign currency depreciates. However, over longer
periods this effect disappears; these investments appear to "catch up" withthe
depreciation of the local currency. Thus, subsequent to a depreciationof the local
currency, expected returns on foreign stock appear relativelyhigh. Note that —as
in the model of the previous section —theincrease in expected returns need not
come from an opportunity to buy the currency cheap.That is, uncovered interest
parity can still hold.33
One might worry that this feature of stock returns is an artifact of such a
long historical sample. In the rapidly-integrating international capitalmarket of
today, perhaps this effect has disappeared. However, to this day, high frequency
correlations between local-currency stock returns and the domestic exchange rate
remain about zero. If, in the long run, PPP still holds —andgreater international
integration suggests that, if anything, it does so more strongly today —thenthis
characterization of changing expected returns still persists. Furthermore, if we
reach a day in which high-frequency currency fluctuations and local-currency returns
become more highly correlated, then even the "free-lunch" case for hedging will
disappear. That is, if there is little exchange-rate exposure (even overthe short
run) in foreign assets in the first place, then there is clearly less impetusto hedge.
6.2. Corporate risk management
Corporations which make physical investments abroad often borrowin local
currency. "Currency hedging" is frequently given as therationale for such local-
currency borrowing, although there are other good explanationsfor it (e.g., hedging
the risks of expropriation).
What are the implications of the above results for such financing decisions? .To
Thi. paperhas not attempted to sort out how much oftheincrease in expected returns is attributabletocurrencies
vnus the assets themselves. I leave that for future work.
24see this, consider a multinational corporation which wishes to borrow to finance a
long-term investment abroad. Suppose that the expected cost of local- and home-
currency debt are the same, and that the company wishes to choose a debt structure
that minimizes return volatility of the entire foreign operation.34 What fraction of
the borrowing should be in local currency?
If purchasing power parity holds, then over time the physical assets are likely to
be naturally hedged. And, if the assets have little long-horizon currency exposure,
the currency composition of debt does not help to hedge the physical assets. To the
extant that this is true, the problem of hedging the returns on the entire foreign
operation comes down to that of hedging the fluctuations in real borrowing costs.
At this point, the logic from above can be applied directly. If the foreign
country is known for its unpredictable and highly volatile inflation rate, then over
long periods, it is likely that local-currency debt will have relatively high real-
return volatility, If, on the other hand, it is the home-currency's inflation rate that
is volatile and unpredictable, then the home-currency debt will have relatively high
real-return volatility. The fraction of borrowing in local currency should therefore be
an increasing function of the volatility of real borrowing costs in the home country
relative to that in the local country. In general, the mix ought to be part of the
corporation's overall risk management strategy.
7. Conclusions
This paper has argued that currency hedges are less useful at reducing real-
return variance at long horizons than they are at short horizons. In a data set of
US financial returns over 200 years we showed that this intuition is borne out over
the sample from the perspective of British international investors.
The data show that at short horizons, full hedging reduces return volatility.
"According to Modigliani-Miller, firms cannot create value by changing the structure of their liabilities, and
therefore should not be concerned with the return volatility implied by a particular debt structure. However, there
are a number of reasons why firms may wish to hedge out return volatility. Froot, Scharf.tein and Stein (1993) review
several motivations for corporate hedging policies and develop a theory of corporate hedging based on costly external
finance.
-
Thisexample contrast, local- and hoxne.currency debt. However, it .hould be clear that the logic is easily extended
to include debt denominated in third currencies.
25However, for horizons of five years or more, foreignstocks display greater return
volatility when hedged than when unhedged. For foreignbonds the cross-over point
is about eight years. I also report minimum-variance hedgeratios at different hori-
zons. This ratio falls from almost 100 percent hedgedat short horizons to an average
of about 35 percent at horizons of 5 to 10 years. Moreover, atthese longer horizons,
even the minimum-vB.riance hedge cannot reducereturn volatility below that of the
unhedged portfolio. Thus, if hedging involves evensmall transactions costs and
counterparty risks, the optimal hedge ratio will decline rapidlytoward zero as the
investment horizon increases.
There are several caveats to these results. First, this paper hasfocused pri-
marily on how hedging effects the variance of anindividual asset class. However,
hedge ratios —likeother asset allocation decisions —shouldalways be determined
according to their effects on the entire portfolio.35
A second caveat concerns the applicability of the long-horizon momentswhich
are discussed and measured above. A single long-horizondata base is surely better
than none at all, but alone it is insufficient. It would clearlybe helpful to have
additional long-horizon data from other country experiences.
360ther work has demonstmted that over shorthorizons, currency hedging can reduce thevo$atilityof widely
diversified portfolioswhichcontain domestic as well as foreign components. See, for example, Glen andJorion (1092).
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30Table 1
Summary Statistics:
Cross-Currency Returns., at Different Investment Horizons
1802-1991 1880-1972 1973-1991
Return on: Variable means.d. means.d. mean s.d.
foreign stocks 6.02 19.60 0.05 6.4621.81 0.09 3.08 24.16 0.24
(real domestic return) 4, 18.2531.99 0.19 19.50 33.99 0.25 10.49 31.05 0.02
4, 30.2842.71 0.25 32.49 40.95 0.15 17.49 44.77 0.39
rfl 60.2744.93 0.40 64.99 69.01 0.60NA NA NA
foreign bonds 3.3410.65 0.19 2.5511.37 0.18 0.48 17.26 0.18
(real domestic return) 4610.12 19.42 0.12 7.5521.01 0.03 1.69 32.80 0.21
4,616.97 28.50 0.07 12.58 28.81 0.17 2.82 27.03 0.19
r6 31.8945.18 0.10 25.16 53.68 0.16NA NA NA
foreign bills 2.9110.46 0.24 1.4611.03 0.25 0.95 16.41 0.13
(real domestic return) 8.96 19.17 0.06 4.5820.57 0.01 1.5430.65 0.28
rt 14.9127.90 0.03 7.6325.66 0.18 2.57 31.94 0.64
r'° 30.4443.87 0.15 15.25 46.83 0.34NA NA NA
Currency hedge 0.557.54 0.01 0.568.03 0.03 1.9116.29 0.10
(nominal domestic return)h 1.9510.36 0.36 1.659.23 0.10 2.99 30.56 0.64
3.2512.41 0.53 2.7514.13 0.22 4.99 27.84 1.74
7.8313.17 0.51 5.5120.20 0.42NA NA NA
Real exchange rate 0.128.74 0.04 0.298.62 0.01 2.47 14.61 0.04
0.56 13.99 0.18 1.1312.79 0.14 5.93 22.82 0.52
0.86 19.55 0.38 1.8913.84 0.07 9.89 26.85 1.11
2.9120.50 0.52 3.7823.00 0.77NA NA NA
Notes to Table 1: Variables are defined as follows: h >i (i,,t+i— +A,cst,
whereij, I =d,fdenotesthe continuously compounded one-period interest rate at time t in the
domestic and foreign currencies, respectively, and aksisthe log of the k-period change in the
domestic price of foreign currency from time t to t + k; :.i: x+1. — +A's+5,
wherex, denotes the continuously compounded one-period return on an portfolio of U.S. stocks,
and X:disthe continuously compounded one-period change in the log of the U.K. CPI; jb x:
— + where Xbdenotesthe continuously compounded one-period return
on U.S. government (and sometimes commercial) bonds; rE +As+1,
where x denotes the continuously compounded one-period return on U.S. government (and some-times commercial) short—term bills; andE — +A'8t+ais thecontinuously
compounded one-period change in the log of the real exchange rate.Table 2
Summary Statistics:
U.S. Real Returns at Different investment Horizons
1802-1991 1880-1972 1973-1991
Return on: Variable means.d. mean s.d.Pi means.d. p1
foreign stocks Vt'.5.90 17.32 0.01 6.1719.09 0.02 5.5515.66 0.32
(real foreign return)y,17.69 30.70 0.30 18.36 32.09 0.30 16.43 16.68 0.46
y 29.42 37.57 0.42 30.60 35.91 0.29 27.38 30.87 0.32
y 57.37 38.22 0.07 61.21 53.14 0.48NA NA NA
foreign bonds 3.227.48 0.43 2.266.06 0.53 1.9912.30 0.33
(real foreign return) Y,b9.56 17.69 0.16 6.4214.81 0.16 4.24 29.19 0.40
16.11 23.11 0.15 10.69 24.14 0.11 7.07 32.38 0.19
y 28.98 35.99 0.36 21.38 42.24 0.02NA NA NA
foreign bills y 2.796.16 0.53 1.175.07 0.66 1.514.20 0.61
(real foreign return) y 8.4115.09 0.21 3.4413.12 0.21 4.39 11.04 0.34
14.06 18.34 0.43 5.7419.87 0.21 NA 14.07 0.43
y 27.54 32.07 0.43 11.48 34.83 0.082.74 NA NA
Notes to Thble 2: Variables are defined as follows: W.E — wherex,
denotesthe continuously compounded one-period return on an portfolio of U.S. stocks, andis
the continuously compounded;one.period..change.in:the log of the U.S. CPI; y6 E
—
whereZb denotes thecontinuously compounded one-period return on U.S. government (and
sometimes commercial) bonds; and y wherezhdenotesthe continuously
compounded one-period return on U.S. government (and sometimes commercial) short-term bills.Table 3
Real Returns on Foreign Investments:
Unhedged versus Fully Hedged
Horizon (k years)
12 34 56 7 8

























Notesto Table 3: Variables are defined as follows: V =vtr(r: ,—h)'where rtdenotesthe
real return in the U.K. on U.S. CPI-linked real assets over a k-period horizon from a UKinvestor's
perspective, and h denotes the return on a pound hedge against the dollarV' = )t.sVsr(r, —h:) '
wherer,denotesthe real return in the U.K. on U.S. stocks over a k-period horizon from aUK
investor's perspectiveS vk —var(r6)whereTtb denotes the real return in the U.K. on U.S.
t,b — Var(r'6—h)
bondsover a k-period horizon from a UK investor's perspective; and VV =var(rLj,where t.nVsr(r__h,)

























Real Return on Foreign Investments:
Estimated Minimum-Variance Hedge Ratios
Holding Horizon (Ic years)








0.120 0.060 0.030 0.020
0.350 0.280 0.240 0.210
















Notesto Table 4: Minimum-variance ratios are estimates of fifromthe regression r',=
a+ flh + c, where r1isthe domestic k-period real return from holding foreign asset 1,
and h is the k-period return on the currency hedge (the domestic currency return of borrowing
in domestic currency to hold foreign deposits). Standard errors of estimated fls are computed
using the largest of several measures, including OLS, Newey-West serial-correlation consistent and






























0.240 0.260 0.290 0.3700.510
0.180 0.200 0.230 0.2800.370
0.1900.210 0.230 0.2700.360Table 5
Decomposition of Hedge Returns
Into:
Real Interest Differentials and Changes In Real Exchange Rates
&'S +R




Horizonh ohsI1 P1.2 P1,3
1 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.647 0.272
2 0.012 0.016 0.012 0.585 0.315
3 0.016 0.023 0.017 0.562 0.301
4 0.0190.030 0.023 0.549 0.283
5 0.022 0.035 0.029 0.496 0.3 13
6 0.022 0.038 0.035 0.430 0.342
7 0.0210.040 0.039 0.368 0.349
8 0.017 0.040 0.043 0.271 0.367
9 0.018 0.042 0.046 0.232 0.390
10 0.019 0.043 0.050 0.206 0.414




w&+1))is the k-period real interest differential, and
EMs+ —ris the k-period change in the log of the real exchange rate.Table 6
Real Return on Foreign Investments:
Estimated Exposures to
Real Interest Differentials and Real Exchange Rate Changes
Holding Horizon (k years)
Asset Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Differentials
foreign stocksfit.0.226 0.014 -0.234 -0.414-0.449-0.398-0.350-0.257
foreign bondsfit,, 0.0990.1050.0870.011-0.097-0.160 -0.218-0.259
foreign bills fit,,0.164 0.2000.2100.1700.1080.0550.005-0.038
Exposure to Real Exchange Rate Changes
foreign stocksfi1.150 0.8940.6830.7200.7870.8951.0401.240
foreign bondsfi,, 0.9190.8870.8760.8410.7430.6900.6600.665
foreign billsfi 1.0401.0801.1101.1101.0701.020 1.0€XJ0.997












Notes to Table 6: Exposure ratios, fit1 and fi are OLS estimates from the regression
=a?+ fitIR' + fiiACSt + c, where isthe domestic k-period real return from hold-
ing foreign asset 1, 1 =s,b,it;>I
— (ia.t+i — isthe k-period real
interest differential; and ts'StA's + w — isthe k-period change in the log of the realexchange rate. Standard errors of estimated fls are computed using the largest of severalmeasures,
including 01.5, Newey-West serial-correlation consistent and Newey-West serial-correlation and
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. The panel entitled "percentage varianceexplained
by exposures"represents the fl2fromthe above regression.Table 7
Real Return on Foreign Investments:
Estimated Minimum-Variance Real Hedge Ratios
Holding Horizon (k years)


















0.170 0.1690.178 0.187 0.199
0.123 0.1290.138 0.150 0.170
0.142 0.157 0.178 0.199 0.220
Notes to Tble































7:-Minimum-variance ratios areestimates:of fl-fromthe regression r1 =
wherer is the domestic k-period real return from holding foreign asset 1,
—Risthe k-period change in the log of the real exchange rate (which
can be interpreted as the return on a real currency hedge under the assumption that cx ante real
interest rates are constant). Standard errors of estimated fis are computed using the largest of
several measures, including 012, Newey-West serial-correlation consistent and Newey-West serial-
correlation and heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.